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WHY ONLY THE STATE MAY INFLICT CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
Abstract: Some theorists argue that a justification of criminal punishment 
presupposes a theory of state power. Although the state is typically 
assigned the task of inflicting criminal sanctions, the mere fact that the 
criminal deserves to be punished cannot in itself justify the infliction of 
punishment by the state, as non-state agents could presumably give people 
their just deserts.  
One way of addressing the plea for a theory of state power would be to 
suggest that state-inflicted sanctions are justified simply on the grounds 
that the state is more likely than other agents to determine accurately what 
a wrongdoer justly deserves and to inflict a just sanction on those who 
deserve it. Hence, the state's role in inflicting criminal sanctions is 
contingent and, in principle, the state could be replaced by other agents, 
e.g., private individuals.  This hypothesis has given rise to recent calls to
reform the state's criminal justice system by introducing privately-inflicted 
sanctions, e.g., shaming penalties, private prisons or private probationary 
services.  
This paper challenges this view and argues that the agency of the state is 
indispensable to criminal sanctions in a way that renders the idea of 
replacing state-inflicted sanctions with privately inflicted sanctions not 
merely contingently undesirable. Privately-inflicted sanctions sever the 
link between state’s judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the action 
and the appropriateness of the sanction and the infliction of sufferings on 
the criminal. When a private individual inflicts punishment she acts on 
what she and not the state judges to be a sufficient basis for action. 
Privately-inflicted sanctions for violations of criminal laws are not 
grounded in the judgments of the appropriate agent, namely the state. It is 
impermissible on the part of the state to approve a sanction inflicted on an 
alleged wrongdoer on the basis of such a private judgment. Such an 
approval grants undue weight to the private judgment of the individual 
who inflicts the sanction. 
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WHY ONLY THE STATE MAY INFLICT CRIMINAL 
SANCTIONS  
By Alon Harel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Criminal sanctions are typically administered by the state. Both the 
determination of the severity of the criminal sanctions and the actual 
infliction of the sanctions are typically carried out by the state (via its 
public officials). Recent developments in the criminal law system are 
designed to shift some of these powers from the state to individual citizens 
(or other private entities). Shaming penalties are one paradigmatic 
example of a shift in the power to determine the severity of sanctions as 
well as the power to inflict sanctions from the state to private citizens.1 
Privately run, for-profit prisons are another example, but here only the 
power to inflict criminal sanctions is transferred from the state to 
corporate bodies. The victims’ rights movement also proposes to shift 
some of the powers to punish from the state to the victims of crime. A less 
well-known example of privately-inflicted sanctions is the recent initiative 
to privatize the probationary system in Britain.2 These developments have 
been thoroughly analyzed by lawyers, economists and sociologists. This 
paper provides a philosophical perspective on privately-inflicted sanctions.  
In this paper I will argue that the recent initiatives to privatize criminal 
law fail to appreciate the intimate relations between the state and criminal 
                                                 
* Alon Harel is the Phillio P. Mizock & Estelle Mizock Chair in Administrative and 
Criminal law at Hebrew University. 
1 For contemporary advocates of shaming sanctions, see Dan Kahan, What do Alternative 
Sanctions Mean? 63 Chicago Law Review 591-653 (1996); Dan M. Kahan, & Eric A. 
Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines 42 Journal of Law and Economics 365-391 (1999). In a recent 
article, Dan Kahan expresses reservations concerning his earlier advocacy of shaming 
penalties. See Dan Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions 84 Texas L. 
Rev. 2075 (2006).  
2 See Offender Management Bill 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmbills/009/2007009.pdf). 
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sanctioning, and that “privatizing” the infliction of criminal sanctions 
undermines the very foundations of the criminal law system. To the extent 
that the state issues criminal prohibitions, it should determine the nature 
and the severity of the sanctions that follow their violation and should 
itself inflict these sanctions. Criminal prohibitions, it will be argued, are 
grounded in the state’s judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the act. 
Delegating the power to determine the nature and severity of the criminal 
sanctions (e.g., by using shaming penalties) or delegating the power to 
inflict criminal sanctions to private entities (e.g., by establishing private 
prisons) severs the link between the state’s judgments concerning the 
wrongfulness of the act and the determination of the severity of the 
sanction or the infliction of the sanction. This link, it will be argued, is 
indispensable and it is impermissible on the part of the state to authorize 
the infliction of sanctions in the absence of such a link.  
In the Grammar of Criminal Law, George Fletcher defends the view that 
there is an intimate relation between criminal law and the state:  
The distinction between political and moral theory is critical to 
the argument. Some writers today use the term 'moral' so 
broadly that their usage obfuscates the important distinction 
between the state's acting legitimately and individuals acting 
morally. The political addresses the power and prerogatives of 
state officials—that is, of human beings cast into a particular 
role of enforcing criminal prohibitions. The moral focuses 
primarily on the lives of individuals, both in their personal 
flourishing and in their relationships with other individuals.  
An example of the kind of the argument I seek to avoid is the 
conventional claim about desert. The argument goes like this. 
Some people – really bad people like Adolph Eichmann or 
Slobodan Milosevic-deserve to be punished. Because they 
deserve a certain consequence, it follows that the state is 
justified in delivering it. This is a non sequitur….Missing are 
the critical premises first that is the business of the state rather 
than of God (or the victim or the victim's family) to punish the 
offender…Just because the offender might deserve 
punishment, it does not follow – without an appropriate theory 
of state power—that the state should assess the degree of 
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deserved punishment and use its power to impose it on the 
offender. The quick assumption that the state is entitled to 
punish offenders who ‘deserve’ it is one of the unfortunate 
banalities of criminal law in our time.3 
Fletcher believes that only a theory of the state can provide an adequate 
explanation of why criminal sanctions should be inflicted by the state. A 
theory of criminal law must be able to explain why the state (rather than 
other agents) is in charge of inflicting sanctions. Moral theorists in general 
and desert theorists in particular, Fletcher argues, do not meet this test and 
thus fail to justify the existence of a state-inflicted scheme of criminal 
sanctions.   
This conclusion, however, is too hasty. The fact that criminal sanctions 
happen to be state-inflicted does not imply that a justification for inflicting 
criminal sanctions presuppose a theory of the state. Arguably the political 
legitimacy of the state rests on its success in inducing moral behavior on 
the part of individuals. The success of the state in inducing moral behavior 
could be regarded as a sufficient justification for assigning the power to 
inflict sanctions to the state. If this is the case, no theory of state power is 
necessary, since criminal sanctions for wrongdoing do not have to be 
inflicted by the state. It is merely a coincidence that the state happens 
(sometimes or even often) to be the agent that is the most capable of 
inflicting sanctions. Consequently, criminal sanctions should be inflicted 
by private individuals when these individuals are better placed or can 
more effectively inflict them. 
Theorists who uphold the view that criminal law could be justified without 
reference to the agency of the state can thus easily address Fletcher's call 
for a justification of state-inflicted criminal sanctions. On this view, 
criminal sanctions should be administered by the institution that is the 
most likely to determine accurately what wrongdoers justly deserve and to 
inflict the just punishment successfully (or efficiently). The rationale 
underlying criminal sanctions (and the criteria for determining the severity 
of the sanction) can thus be fully accounted for without reference to the 
                                                 
3 George Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative and 
International vol. 1 pp. 226-7 (Oxford University Press, 2007).   
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agent who is assigned the task of inflicting them. Once the rationale for 
inflicting sanctions has been identified, the theorist should seek the agent 
who is most likely to succeed in executing this task. Criminal sanctioning 
is therefore ultimately a task in search of an appropriate agent. So, while 
Fletcher is right in pointing out that a complete justification of criminal 
law requires a justification for a state-inflicted scheme of criminal 
sanctions, such a justification is ultimately founded on instrumental or 
pragmatic reasons, e.g., the distinctive ability of the state to identify what 
just desert is and to inflict it successfully or more efficiently than other 
agents. Such a justification sharply separates the question of what the 
rationale of criminal punishment and the criteria for determining its 
appropriateness are and the question of who the agent in charge of 
administering the sanctions should be. The answer to the latter question 
can only be answered once the former question concerning the rationale 
underlying criminal punishment and the criteria for determining the 
appropriate sanction have been addressed.  
While Fletcher raises an important challenge to desert theorists, his 
analysis fails to investigate whether desert theorists could address this 
challenge. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap and establish that the 
state is not merely a means for inflicting deserved suffering on criminals. 
In fact, I will argue that state-inflicted sanctions are fundamentally 
different from privately-inflicted sufferings on the guilty. Under this view, 
the replacement of the state with other agents is not merely impractical or 
contingently undesirable. Rather, the agency of the state is necessary for 
the justified infliction of criminal punishment. Establishing a system of 
privately-inflicted criminal sanctions in fact challenges some of the most 
fundamental convictions underlying the criminal law system. To the extent 
that the state prohibits certain sorts of conduct, it is the state and the state 
alone which ought to administer sanctions for the violations of these 
prohibitions. A full understanding of the normative justification for 
criminal sanctions requires an understanding of the indispensability of the 
agency of the state to the legitimacy of the criminal law system.   
Section II starts by defining what I mean by “criminal sanctions”, 
“privately-inflicted sanctions” and “state-inflicted sanctions.” Then it 
differentiates between three types of justifications for state-inflicted 
criminal sanctions: instrumental justifications, the normative preconditions 
justifications and state-centered justifications. Section III provides 
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arguments in favor of an “integrationist” state-centered justification. It 
argues that the practice of inflicting sanctions for wrongdoing is an 
integral part of other duties and powers that the state has. The 
appropriateness of sanctions and their success in achieving their goals 
depends on their being integrated into other spheres of the state’s activity. 
Most importantly, inflicting criminal sanctions presupposes that the state 
forms a judgment with respect to the wrongfulness of the act and the 
appropriateness of the sanction. Privately-inflicted sanctions, it will be 
argued, do not reflect the state’s judgment concerning the wrongfulness of 
the act or the appropriateness of the sanction. The infliction of these 
sanctions severs the link between the state’s judgments concerning the 
wrongfulness of the act and the appropriateness of the sanction or the 
infliction of the sanction. Section IV investigates the normative 
implications of the “integrationist justification” for the state’s power to 
inflict sanctions and argues that the integrationist justification casts doubts 
on the legitimacy of some contemporary punitive practices such as 
shaming penalties and private prisons.  
II. WHY STATE-INFLICTED CRIMINAL SANCTIONS?   
Prior to examining the three types of justifications for state-inflicted 
criminal sanctions, I will explain what I mean by criminal sanctions and 
by state-inflicted and privately-inflicted sanctions.  
The fact that one of the characteristic features of criminal sanctions is that 
they are administered by the state may generate a suspicion that the state-
inflicted nature of criminal sanction is not normatively required for the 
justified infliction of these sanctions but simply part of the definition of 
criminal sanctions. Thus, privately inflicted sanctions are not illegitimate; 
instead they simply ought not to be labeled “criminal”. Rebutting this 
suspicion and establishing a normative argument against privately-
inflicted criminal sanctions requires characterizing criminal sanctions in a 
way which is independent of the agent who inflicts these sanctions.  
Following HLA Hart, I will characterize criminal sanctions as sanctions 
which involve “pain or other consequences normally considered 
unpleasant” which are inflicted upon “an actual or supposed offender for 
his offence” and which must also be imposed for “an offence against legal 
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rules”.4 There is however an additional component not explicitly 
mentioned by Hart which must be stressed: the nature of the remedy. It is 
obvious that not all unpleasant consequences triggered by violation of a 
legal rule should be classified as punishment. Tort liability for negligence 
per se, based on the violation of a statutory norm, could meet this test.5 
Yet tort liability differs from criminal liability in that the remedy is 
typically compensatory rather than punitive.  
There are of course cases in which the state inflicts pain or other 
unpleasant consequences that are not characterized as criminal 
punishments. The state deports aliens, expatriates individuals under 
extreme circumstances and impeaches presidents for wrongful behavior.6 
None of these acts is categorized as a criminal sanction. The arguments 
provided below as to why the state rather than private agents ought to have 
the power to inflict criminal sanctions may apply to some of these cases 
even if they are not traditionally categorized as criminal. However, given 
the fact that criminal law is a paradigmatic case involving punitive 
measures triggered by violations of state prohibitions, I shall use the term 
criminal sanctions to refer to all these punitive measures even if they are 
not traditionally classified as criminal.  
The distinction between state-inflicted sanctions and privately-inflicted 
sanctions also requires some clarification. State-inflicted sanctions are 
sanctions administered by state officials in their capacity as state officials. 
Privately-inflicted sanctions are inflicted by private entities. The privately-
inflicted sanctions which are the target of my critique are those and only 
those sanctions inflicted by individuals (or other private entities) at the 
encouragement, or initiative of the state. Thus, it is not claimed here that it 
is impermissible for individuals to condemn convicted offenders on the 
                                                 
4  See HLA Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment in Punishment and 
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 1, 4-5 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968). 
5  The part of the civil law bearing the strongest resemblance to the criminal law is the 
law of tort. Consequently textbooks of criminal law often start by differentiating between 
criminal law and tort law. See, e.g., Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 25 
(London, Stevens & Sons, 2nd ed., 1983) 
6  These are the examples provided by George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 412 
(Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1978) 
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basis of a judgment that criminals are evil, or that they ought to suffer etc. 
Instead, what is impermissible is for the state to hand over the infliction of 
sanctions to private individuals who inflict the sanctions on its behalf.  
One might object here that once the state hands over to an individual or a 
private entity the power to inflict a sanction, the sanction thereby becomes 
a state-inflicted sanction. From this it would follow that it is conceptually 
impossible to inflict a state-approved privately-inflicted sanction. This 
objection is based on a misunderstanding. To qualify as a state-inflicted 
sanction, the sanction must be inflicted by a state official. An individual 
who is called upon “to shame” an offender or a private corporation that is 
hired to run a prison does not thereby become an official of the state and, 
consequently, the sanctions inflicted by it are privately-inflicted sanctions. 
To qualify as a state-inflicted sanction, the agent inflicting it must be an 
agent who is morally barred from acting on the basis of its own 
independent judgments, e.g., a judge or a prison guard. In contrast, a 
private individual who is called upon to shame an offender or a 
corporation which is hired to run a prison are private entities and the 
sanctions they inflict are therefore privately-inflicted sanctions.   
I will now turn to the description of three types of justifications for state-
inflicted criminal sanctions. Under the first type of justifications – the 
instrumental justifications - the state is the appropriate agent for inflicting 
criminal sanctions simply because it is deliberative and impartial. As such, 
it is the most qualified to determine what the just (or appropriate) 
punishment is and to inflict it on those who deserve it. In principle, the 
infliction of criminal sanctions could be performed by other, non-state 
agents; and, furthermore, if circumstances change, it is possible that 
institutions other than the state should (wholly or in part) replace the state. 
Under the second type of justifications – the normative precondition 
justifications – the infliction of criminal sanctions by the state achieves 
goals which, in principle, could be fully realized through the infliction of 
sanctions by private agents. Yet, in contrast to the instrumental 
justifications, there are normative constraints that preclude the infliction of 
sanctions by agents other than the state. In other words, although the 
agency of the state is not essential to the success of criminal sanctions, it is 
a non-contingent normative precondition for the just infliction of criminal 
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punishment.7 Finally, under the third type of justifications –  the state-
centered justifications – the power to inflict criminal sanctions is an agent-
dependent power – a power which can be successfully exercised only by 
the state. State-inflicted sanctions are designed to realize goals or perform 
tasks which cannot, in principle, be performed successfully by private 
institutions or individuals acting on their own. There is a fundamental 
difference between state-inflicted criminal punishment and suffering 
inflicted on the guilty by other agents. For this reason criminal sanctions 
can only be carried out by the state.  
This classification shows clearly what the controversy between theories of 
punishment involves. Some theories regard the state’s involvement in 
punishment as purely instrumental and, consequently, assert that the 
agency of the state is not necessary for the justifiability of criminal 
sanctions. Other theories perceive the power to punish as inherently 
belonging to the state and thus as indispensable for the justifiability of 
criminal sanctions.  
The first type of justifications – instrumental justifications – is premised 
on the idea that punishment serves important societal goals that could in 
principle be realized by other non-state agents. However, the state is seen 
as more capable or better placed to create the institutions and/or sustain 
the practices which guarantee that punishment is imposed in accordance 
with the gravity of the offence. A variant of this argument is that state-
inflicted sanctions are justified because the state’s costs in establishing the 
relevant institutions or sustaining them are lower than that of other agents. 
                                                 
7  Asserting that the agency of the state is a “non-contingent normative precondition for 
the just infliction of punishment” raises questions concerning the nature and the strength 
of this normative precondition. The normative precondition justification would not 
preclude the possibility that there may be circumstances under which non-state agents can 
justly inflict criminal sanctions. Yet, the normative preconditions justification maintains 
that, under normal conditions, there are central features of the state that make it the only 
agent which can inflict criminal sanctions. Radical transformation of the state or of other 
agents may open the possibility that other agents would justly inflict criminal sanctions. 
The conditions which could justify such a change ought to be more extreme than those 
which would justify such a change under the instrumental view. A simple change in the 
costs of privately-inflicted sanctions or in the deliberative powers of the state or private 
agents would not suffice to justify transferring the power to inflict sanctions from the 
state to private agents.  
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A well known proponent of the view that the state is better capable of 
determining the appropriate severity of sanctions is John Locke who 
believed that: 
To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature, every 
one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not 
but it will be objected, That it is unreasonable for Men to be 
Judges in their own Cases, that Self-Love will make Men 
partial to themselves and their Friends. And on the other side, 
that Ill Nature, Passion and Revenge will carry them too far in 
punishing others. And hence nothing but Confusion and 
Disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly 
appointed Government to restrain the partiality and violence of 
men. I easily grant, that Civil Government is the proper 
Remedy for the inconveniencies of the State of Nature, which 
must certainly be Great, where Men may be judges in their own 
Case, since ‘iis easilt to be imagined, that he who was so unjust 
as to do his Brother an Injury, will scarce be so just as to 
condemn himself for it. 8 
According to Locke, the state should be empowered to inflict sanctions on 
those who transgress the laws of nature, because the state is less partial 
than alternative agents in its treatment of offenders and consequently less 
likely to inflict inappropriate sanctions. In contrast, when individuals are 
called upon to inflict sanctions on their friends, they are likely to inflict 
sanctions that are too light. In other cases, motives of vengeance may 
induce individuals to inflict sanctions that are excessive. Interestingly law 
and economics scholars often endorse a similar view. In their view, 
punishment should be supplied by the state because the infliction of 
sanctions involves a collective action problem.9 The individual who 
inflicts a sanction has to bear the costs himself whereas the benefits 
resulting from the infliction of sanctions (e.g., crime prevention) are 
                                                 
8  See, e.g., John Locke, Two Treaties of Government: Second Treatise section 13 
(Cambridge University Press, ed. Peter Laslett, 1960). 
9 See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II pp. 9-15 (Cambridge University Press, 1989).  
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enjoyed by everybody. Consequently, individuals have sub-optimal 
incentives to inflict sanctions.10  
This brief discussion is sufficient to illustrate that two of the most 
influential views concerning punishment, namely, certain influential 
versions of retributivism and deterrence theories fall under the category of 
instrumental theories. Some (although not all) retributivists argue that 
punishment is justified in order “to ensure that wrong-doers receive the 
suffering which they deserve.”11 Under this view, “necessarily acts of 
certain kinds have an intrinsic property that it is fit, appropriate or ‘called 
for’ that the perpetrator suffers for it.”12 But there is no principled reason 
why the infliction of deserved suffering needs to be performed by the 
state. In fact: “if a wrong-doer suffers some natural calamity – especially 
if it is a consequence of her wrong-doing, or resembles the harm she had 
done to others – this may be seen… as ‘just what she deserves…’”13 The 
same view concerning the role of the state in punishment is shared by 
other types of retributivists, for example, those who believe that 
punishment expresses punitive emotions such as resentment or 
indignation.14 In the view of “punitive emotions” retributivists, “certain 
wrongdoers quite properly excite the resentment (anger, hatred) of all 
right-thinking people, and the criminal law is a civilized and efficient way 
                                                 
10 This is an argument in favor of the state inflicting the sanction or at least paying for its 
infliction but not necessarily determining its size.  
11  See R. A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 198 (Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
12  See Thomas E. Hill, Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment 18 Law and 
Philosophy 407, 425 (1999)  
13  Duff, supra note 11 at 198.  For a clarification and defense of the claim that the guilty 
deserve to suffer, see Lawrence H. Davis, They Deserve to Suffer 32 Analysis 136-140 
(1972). For a very careful articulation of desert theories, see Hill id at 413-414. Hill 
distinguishes between a practical or action-guiding desert theories and a merely faith 
guiding or wish-expression desert theories. The former argue that perpetrating crimes 
provide one a reason to inflict sufferings on the guilty while the latter argue merely that 
perpetrating crimes provides one a reason to wish that the guilty suffer. It is clear that a 
justification of punishment ought to be based on a strong, i.e., action-guiding desert 
theory.  
14  See R. A. Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community 23-27 (Oxford 
University Press, 2001).  
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in which such passions may be directed toward their proper objects, 
allowing victims to get legitimate revenge consistently with the 
maintenance of public order.”15 To the extent that desert-based 
retributivists or the “punitive emotions” retributivists insist that it is the 
state rather than other agents that should inflict the deserved sufferings, it 
is simply because the state is well placed to determine what a person 
deserves and to inflict the sanction.  
Deterrence theorists believe that deterrence depends on the probability of 
detection and the severity of the sanction.16 The agency of the state plays 
no essential role in the justification of punishment and consequently there 
is no principled reason to believe that non-state agents cannot inflict 
sanctions that will deter wrongdoers. In fact, deterrence theorists have 
often pointed out that non-state agents may be more effective than state 
agents in inflicting sanctions and that such sanctions may be more 
effective in deterring crimes.17  
To conclude, justifying state-inflicted punishments on the basis of 
instrumental justifications requires two argumentative steps. First, one 
must establish that, in principle, inflicting sanctions for wrongdoing is 
appropriate or desirable. The infliction of sanctions of an appropriate 
magnitude fulfills an important role, e.g., the infliction of sufferings on 
those who deserve it or deterring or preventing crime. Second, one must 
establish that state-inflicted punishments are in fact the most effective 
means of inflicting the appropriate sanctions for transgressions. The 
criteria for the appropriateness of the sanctions can be based on 
considerations of justice, e.g., desert or they can be utilitarian. In both 
cases, however, the prospects of success in identifying and inflicting the 
                                                 
15  See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 3-4 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1988).  
16 See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 76 Journal of 
Political Economy 169-217 (1968).  
17 Economic advocates of deterrence theories have often argued for the use of "bounty 
hunters” to detect crime. See, e.g., Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement 
of Fines 9 Journal of Legal Studies 105-127 (1980); Steven Shavell, The Optimal 
Structure of Law Enforcement 36 Journal of Law & Economics 255-287 (1993). The 
advocates of shaming penalties also share the belief that privately-inflicted sanctions may 
be a better way of preventing crime.  See references in supra note 1. 
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appropriate sanctions or the cost-effectiveness in performing this task (or 
other contingent advantages) provide the sole basis for determining who 
should have the power to inflict sanctions. Punishment can therefore be 
described as a task in search of an agent capable of performing it.  
Normative preconditions arguments also maintain that punishment can be 
imposed by non-state agents. Furthermore, punishments inflicted by non-
state agents can in principle function in the same ways and be valuable for 
the same reasons as state-inflicted sanctions. Nevertheless, the advocates 
of normative preconditions justifications maintain that punishment 
inflicted by non-state agents is unjust for principled non-contingent 
reasons. A familiar argument along these lines maintains that punishment 
is designed to deter crimes, but that procedural considerations require that 
the severity of punishment be determined on the basis of a democratic 
deliberative process. It is thus unjust to inflict sanctions (even if these 
sanctions are "deserved" or produce efficient incentives) unless certain 
procedural preconditions are satisfied. These procedural preconditions 
require (at least under normal circumstances) the agency of the state. 
Another version of this type of justifications asserts that punishment is 
inherently a prerogative of the victim. The infliction of sanctions by the 
state is justified only when victims consent to transfer their power to 
inflict sanctions to the state. State-inflicted sanctions are thus just because 
the power to inflict sanctions was voluntarily transferred to the state by its 
citizens. In some passages of his famous discussion of punishment, John 
Locke argues in this vein that the consent of the governed to delegate their 
powers to punish is a necessary procedural requirement.18 
The third type of justifications, the state-centered justifications for 
criminal sanctions, takes a more radical route and maintains that state-
inflicted sanctions are fundamentally different from sanctions imposed by 
other agents. Although privately-inflicted sanctions may be desirable for 
various reasons, they are desirable for different reasons than state-inflicted 
sanctions. A useful analogy illustrating the nature of state-centered 
justifications is the blood feud. In a blood feud it is not the mere act of 
killing that counts; it is rather the performance of the killing by the 
appropriate agent, i.e., by a (male) member of the victim’s family that 
                                                 
18  John Locke, The Second Treatise, supra note 8 87.  
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counts. It is clear that in the bible it is only a specific member of the 
victim’s family who had the right and responsibility to kill the slayer with 
impunity.19 The agent killing the murderer in a blood feud is not perceived 
as a means to perform the (allegedly just) act of killing; instead it is the act 
of killing which provides an opportunity for the appropriate agent to 
redress the injustice. A killing not performed by the appropriate agent does 
not therefore constitute blood feud and cannot redress the injustice.20  
Joel Feinberg’s theory of punishment is an example of a state-centered 
justification. Under his famous formulation of the expressive theory of 
punishment: “punishment is a conventional device for the expression of 
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval 
and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of 
those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”21 This function can 
only be performed by the state since “punishment expresses the 
judgment…of the community that what the criminal did was wrong.”22 In 
contemporary societies it is the state (and perhaps the state alone) that is 
understood to speak in the name of the community. Punishment of 
criminals performed by agents other than the state may of course deter 
wrongdoers, satisfy retributivist concerns and serve other important 
functions, but it does not have the same symbolic expressive significance 
that Feinberg believes punishment ought to have.  
                                                 
19  See, e.g., Pamela Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World 24 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
20 This implies that even if blood feud may serve some of the functions that in our society 
are served by punishment, e.g., desert or deterrence, there are fundamental differences 
between these practices. Punishment involves suffering of the person who perpetrated the 
crime. Blood feud involves inflicting death by a relative of the victim. In punishment, it is 
the agency of the perpetrator of the crime that counts while in blood feud, it is the agency 
of the person who inflicts the sanction that counts.  
21  See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment in A Reader on 
Punishment 74 (ed. R.A. Duff and David Garland, Oxford University Press, 1994).  
22  Id at 76. Of course one could argue that a private sanction inflicted by individuals in 
the community may even better express the community’s sentiments. It is not however 
my aim here to defend the position that the state speaks “in the name of the community,” 
but only to point out theorists who defend state-centered justifications for criminal 
sanctions.  
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Another influential example of a state-centered justification for state-
inflicted sanctions can be traced back to Kant’s discussion of punishment 
in the Metaphysics of Morals:  
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of 
all its members (e.g., if a people inhabiting an island decided to 
separate and disperse throughout the world), the last murderer 
remaining in prison would first have to be executed, so that 
each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt 
does not cling to the people for not having insisted upon this 
punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as 
collaborators in this public violation of justice.23 
Under one plausible interpretation, Kant believes that the last murderer 
has to be executed before the dispersion of the society.24 An attempt to 
remedy the great injustice of not executing the murderer before the 
dispersion of the society could thus not be remedied by killing him after 
the dispersion of the society. For this would constitute a private act of 
killing rather than a public act of execution and, unlike a public execution, 
a private killing could not be done in the name of the people as a 
collectivity. The practice of state-inflicted executions of murderers is thus 
fundamentally different from a practice where murders are killed by non-
state agents. It is the difference in the identity of the agent which explains 
why the former act is required by justice, while the latter is prohibited.  
                                                 
23  Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 106 (Cambridge University Press, 
Translated and edited by Mary Gregor, 1996).  
24  This conclusion follows from the interpretation given to this section by Thomas Hill. 
Hill believes that Kant’s theory of punishment is a mixed theory. Establishing the 
practice of punishing wrongdoers is designed to protect freedom rather than to inflict 
deserved sanctions. Once this scheme is established, state officials are required to impose 
sanctions as prescribed by law, without deviating for pragmatic reasons. This section is 
understood by Hill to highlight the officials’ duty to apply the law, i.e., to “reaffirm the 
idea that those responsible for enforcing the law must apply the legally prescribed 
sanctions without concern for whether punishment has any deterrent value in the 
particular case.” See Hill, supra note 12 at 433. After the dispersion of the state there are 
no officials who are charged with the responsibility of imposing sanctions prescribed by 
law. Hence the infliction of suffering cannot be justified as a part of the faithful 
fulfillment of the officials’ duties.  
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Note that the advocates of state-centered justifications for criminal 
punishments need not deny that some of the desirable byproducts of 
criminal punishments (e.g., deterring crimes, or inflicting deserved 
sufferings on the guilty) can be achieved by sanctions inflicted by non-
state agents. In order to be classified as an advocate of a state-centered 
justification for criminal sanctions, it is sufficient to maintain that state-
inflicted criminal sanctions have some central functions which cannot, in 
principle, be realized by non-state agents.  
The proposed classification of justifications of state-inflicted sanctions 
helps in providing a better understanding of the controversy identified by 
Fletcher. Some theorists uphold an instrumentalist view of state-inflicted 
sanctions. In their view, a complete justification of the practice of criminal 
punishment can be provided without reference to the agency of the state; 
the state being merely a convenient agent for performing a task which can 
be fully justified independently of the agency of the state. In contrast, 
advocates of both the normative preconditions justification and the state-
centered justification argue that criminal sanctions cannot be justified 
without reference to the agency of the state. Criminal sanctions are 
political in essence; their understanding presupposes an understanding of 
the distinctive features of the state.  
III. IN DEFENSE OF A STATE-CENTERED 
JUSTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 
Section II investigated three types of justifications of state-inflicted 
criminal sanctions: instrumental justifications, normative preconditions 
justifications and state-centered justifications. In this section, I argue that 
state-centered justifications provide a more accurate account of our pre-
theoretical intuitions. Furthermore, I develop a sub-class of state-centered 
justifications which I call “integrationist justifications” for state-inflicted 
criminal sanctions. Under an integrationist justification, the successful 
exercise of the power to inflict sanctions depends upon a complex 
normative framework that comprises other state duties and powers. The 
power to inflict criminal sanctions is inextricably linked with the creation 
of prohibitions whose violations call for punitive measures. The power to 
inflict sanctions has to be a state power because of the interdependence 
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between the state’s power to create prohibitions and the power to inflict 
sanctions triggered by violating these prohibitions.  
Sub-section A introduces the idea of an integrationist justification through 
the example of parent-children relationships. Sub-section B argues that an 
integrationist justification for the state’s power to inflict criminal sanctions 
is consistent with some deeply seated pre-theoretical convictions. Then it 
develops an integrationist justification for state-inflicted criminal 
sanctions.  
A. The Parental Power to Inflict Sanctions: An Integrationist Justification  
This section explores the justification for parentally-inflicted sanctions. In 
particular it investigates the case for a “parent-centered” justification of 
punishment inflicted on children. It is important however to concede at the 
outset that this section is not aimed at conclusively establishing the 
soundness of a parent-centered justification. Instead, it aims to explore the 
structure of such a justification in order to facilitate the construction of an 
analogous argument in the political context. 
A parent-centered justification of the punishment of children asserts that 
parentally-inflicted sanctions realize goals or perform tasks that cannot be 
successfully realized by non-parental agents. There is thus a fundamental 
difference between parentally-inflicted punishment and suffering inflicted 
on children by other agents (or natural forces). The successful infliction of 
punishments (or at least some types of punishments) hinges upon the 
identity of the agent who performs it.  
To examine the plausibility of this justification compare it with an 
instrumental justification. At the center of such a justification would be the 
idea that punishing children is conducive to their education and promotes 
their well-being. Having established the desirability of inflicting sanctions, 
an instrumental justification would then point to the fact that parents 
typically love their children and are deeply interested their future well-
being. Because of this a parent is more likely than other agents to punish a 
child under circumstances in which the punishment contributes to the 
child's well-being. 
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This argument has some intuitive force and yet it fails to explain 
fundamental intuitions concerning parenthood. According to a deeply held 
belief, the power to inflict sanctions belongs “naturally” to parents and 
cannot be transferred to a third party without undermining the very 
institution of parenthood. In contrast to the instrumentalist justification, 
the parent-centered justification which sees parenthood as necessary for 
the successful infliction of sanctions can better account for this conviction. 
Depriving the parents of the power to inflict sanctions on their children 
and granting such a power to another agent would in effect transform that 
other agent into a quasi-parent and would deprive the “parent” of his or 
her natural parental responsibilities.25 Success in performing the parental 
tasks presupposes exercising the power to inflict sanctions and vice versa.  
This view does not imply that one cannot think of new institutional 
arrangements under which the power to inflict sanctions would be shifted. 
Under one possible institutional arrangement, the community is 
responsible for raising children and every adult person has the power to 
inflict sanctions on them. By becoming quasi-parents members of the 
community take upon themselves new responsibilities and are granted new 
powers (other than the power to inflict sanctions). This transfer of the 
power to inflict sanctions from the "parents" to all adult members of the 
community can thus be seen as a partial transfer of parenthood from the 
“parents” to the community, and this will have far-reaching consequences. 
Under the alternative arrangement I envision, the transfer of power must 
include powers other than the power to inflict sanctions. Furthermore, 
such a view does not imply that parents have an exclusive power to punish 
their children. The integrationist justification could grant parents the 
exclusive power to punish children for certain types of misbehavior but 
                                                 
25 To establish the alleged naturalness of parenthood think of a community in which 
parents are barred from inflicting sanctions on their children and the power to inflict 
sanctions is assigned to the parents' closest neighbors. Such a practice could be justified 
on the grounds that loving parents may be too soft and consequently that the sanctions 
they are likely to inflict on their children are too lenient.  Neighbors, under this view, are 
less partial and more objective in their judgments concerning punishment. I suspect many 
would reject such a proposal as preposterous not merely because of the flaws in its 
factual premises. The resistance to such a proposal rests on the conviction that the power 
to punish "belongs" to the parents or that it is "natural" that parents are the ones who have 
the power to inflict sanctions and that stripping parents of their power to punish should be 
equated with stripping parents of parenthood. 
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there is nothing in principle that prevents giving others the power to 
punish for other types of misbehavior. Last, such a justification does not 
preclude the possibility that the parents’ powers to punish be constrained 
by the state in order to prevent abuse of that power, namely the infliction 
of punishment which does not serve the purposes for which the power was 
granted in the first place.  
Can the conviction that the power to inflict sanctions naturally “belongs” 
to the parents be justified? Why should not the power to inflict sanctions 
be assigned to the agent who is most likely to exercise it properly? After 
all sanctions inflicted on children are designed to educate them and, while 
it is possible that parents are more likely to exercise this power in a way 
which is conducive to this purpose, there is nothing which, in principle, 
precludes the possibility that other agents would be more successful at this 
task.  
One plausible defense of a parent-centered justification for granting 
parents the power to inflict sanctions is an integrationist defense. Under 
such a justification, parental duties and powers cannot be understood in 
isolation. Rather the powers exercised in punishing a child are affected by 
and, in turn, reflect on other parental duties and vice versa. The 
sentiments, convictions and judgments acquired in the course of inflicting 
sanctions are conducive to the fulfillment of other parental duties and the 
sentiments, convictions and judgments acquired in the course of fulfilling 
other parental duties are conducive to the rightful infliction of sanctions. It 
seems for instance that punishment of children inculcates in parents 
awareness that the children’s well-being ought not to be equated with their 
immediate short-term pleasures. The parents’ power to punish children is 
conducive to a better appreciation of what the well-being of their children 
consists of.  
The conviction that the power to inflict sanctions "naturally belongs" to 
parents can now be seen as founded on the interrelations between different 
parental duties and powers. The power to inflict sanctions is “natural” to 
parenthood because having such a power and/or exercising it is conducive 
to the emergence of certain sentiments, to the maintenance of practices 
and to the formation of beliefs and judgments which are conducive to 
parenthood. Under this view, one must resist the temptation to look at 
punishment simply as a means of fulfilling an important task and then go 
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in search for the agent who is the most capable of performing this task. 
Instead, one ought to regard parenthood as an important social institution 
for the sake of which one ought to assign tasks that contribute to the 
overall success of this institution. The appropriateness of sanctions and 
their success in achieving their goals thus depends on their being 
integrated with other aspects of parenthood.26 Parenthood and in particular 
the emotional and deliberative preconditions for being a good parent are 
thus the key to the understanding of punishment.  
Here we have the outline of a justification for giving parents the power to 
punish their children. Under this justification, assigning the power to 
inflict sanctions to parents is not justified (or, at least, not primarily) 
justified on the grounds that the parents are the most capable of inflicting 
it successfully, but on the grounds that the power to inflict sanctions 
serves parenthood. Given that the institution of parenthood is a desirable 
institution and as such worth maintaining, it follows that one has reasons 
to create a normative framework necessary for parenthood and to assign 
the power to inflict sanctions to the parents.  
To sum up, the integrationist justification for assigning parents the power 
to inflict sanctions analyzes parenthood in its totality as a complex relation 
which involves the fulfillment of duties and the exercise of powers. The 
appropriateness of assigning these duties and powers to an agent ought not 
to be judged separately. Instead, a complete account of parenthood ought 
to be based on an understanding of the mutual interrelations between these 
different powers and duties.  
B. An Integrationist Justification for State-Inflicted Sanctions 
Can a similar integrationist justification be provided for state-inflicted 
sanctions? Under such a justification, criminal punishment is not merely 
an important task in search of an agent capable of performing it; instead 
the infliction of criminal punishment is an integral part of successful 
statehood in the same way that the infliction of sanctions on children is 
                                                 
26  The integrationist justification is hardly a novelty in the literature on parenthood. One 
influential argument suggests that the power to command and the duty to care are 
interrelated. See Saint Augustine, City of God Book XIX chapter 14 (Penguin Books, 
2003).  
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perceived by advocates of the integrationist justification as an integral part 
of successful parenting. The power to inflict criminal sanctions on 
wrongdoers is essential to the state because it is interrelated with other 
powers and duties of the state such that stripping the state of this power 
disrupts its proper functioning. The first sub-section points out some pre-
theoretical intuitions which support an integrationist justification. The 
second sub-section develops an integrationist justification for state’s 
power to punish.  
i) 1. Intuitions Supporting an Integrationist Justification for State-
Inflicted Sanctions 
Several intuitive observations support the conjecture that the state’s power 
to inflict criminal sanctions is grounded in an integrationist justification. 
The power to inflict criminal sanctions is a sphere of operation of the state 
which is almost universally perceived to be basic and fundamental. It is 
easy to conceive of a state that does not redistribute resources or one that 
does not maintain a tort law system. To imagine a society without a 
criminal law system or without a scheme of sanctions for the violation of 
norms is regarded often as tantamount to imagining a stateless existence. 
There are of course numerous other ways in which the state operates, but 
most of these seem to be more peripheral to the state's existence than the 
power to inflict sanctions for transgressions. 
Furthermore, most people do not perceive privately-inflicted sanctions and 
state-inflicted sanctions as interchangeable. A criminal conviction may 
often give rise to (justified or unjustified) negative reactions on the part of 
private individuals. These negative reactions may in turn lead to the 
infliction of (justified or unjustified) privately-inflicted sanctions. There 
may be some sound prudential or moral reasons not to socialize with a 
person convicted of a crime. But privately-inflicted sanctions cannot 
substitute wholly or in part for state-inflicted sanctions following a 
criminal conviction. If criminal punishment could successfully be inflicted 
by non-state agents, state-inflicted criminal sanctions should arguably, as a 
matter of justice, be calculated in a way which takes into consideration the 
private sufferings of the criminal (or, at least, the private sufferings 
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resulting from privately-inflicted sanctions).27 Yet, while courts 
sometimes take into account the private sufferings borne by the criminal, 
they are not obliged to do so. The private sufferings of the guilty 
(including private sufferings resulting from the infliction of privately-
inflicted sanctions) may lead courts to inflict a more lenient sentence out 
of compassion, but such leniency is discretionary and many theorists have 
opposed it.28 This indicates that state-inflicted sanctions are not typically 
viewed as commensurate with private sanctions. Privately-inflicted 
sanctions and state-inflicted sanctions are not merely two forms of 
commensurate sufferings which are added to each other. A possible 
explanation for the reluctance to conduct such a calculation is that private 
sanctions are “not imposed by the state, and whatever is not imposed by 
the state cannot be part of offender’s punishment.”29 
Both of these observations can be easily explained within the framework 
of a state-centered justification. In a state-centered justification, the power 
to inflict criminal sanctions is understood to be essential to statehood such 
that stripping the state of this power frustrates the functioning of the state 
as such. The non-substitutability of privately-inflicted sanctions for state-
inflicted sanctions also point to the fundamental role that the state as the 
agent in charge of inflicting sanctions plays in justifying the infliction of 
these sanctions. These considerations support a state-centered justification 
of criminal sanctions. This leaves open, however, the question of whether 
such a justification can be provided.   
                                                 
27 Law and economics theorists have often advocated such a position. In the context of 
tort law, see, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Non-Legal 
Sanctions from Damages? 30 Journal of Legal Studies 401-422 (2001) 
28 See, e.g., Richard Bierschbach Alex Stein, Overenforcement 93 Georgetown L.J. 1743, 
1750-1752 (2005).  Even theorists who support the substitutability of state-inflicted and 
privately-inflicted sanctions concede that this is not the general view. See, e.g., Douglas 
Husak, “Already Punished Enough” 18 Philosophical Topics 79 (1990). An interesting 
indication to the reluctance to take into account sufferings resulting from privately-
inflicted sanctions can be found in German criminal law. Section 51 of the German 
Criminal Code entitled “crediting” requires courts to deduct sanctions imposed by courts 
for the same offense, but it does not indicate that privately-inflicted sanctions ought to be 
deducted. The German criminal code differentiates sharply between state-inflicted 
sanctions and privately-inflicted sanctions.  
29  See Husak, id at 85. Husak himself however rejects this view.  
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ii) 2. Why Only the State Can Inflict Criminal Sanctions? 
Some opponents of privately-inflicted criminal sanctions argue that a 
delegation of the power to inflict sanctions to private individuals raises 
serious pragmatic concerns.30 I wish however to raise a principled 
argument against such a delegation – an argument which suggest that even 
if the pragmatic concerns can be overcome, such a delegation is 
nonetheless impermissible. 
The most fundamental task of the state is the task of governing justly. Just 
governance requires the state to govern its citizens under constraints 
dictated by justice. Just governance presupposes the guidance of behavior 
and the issuing of prohibitions. Note that the integrationist justification 
provided here is premised on the assumption that the state is justified in 
issuing prohibitions and that the violation of these prohibitions justifiably 
triggers the infliction of sanctions. The integrationist justification aims to 
show that when these conditions are satisfied, the state and the state alone 
ought to make determinations concerning the severity of these sanctions 
and then inflict them. The state being the initiator of criminal prohibitions 
cannot thus delegate the powers to determine the severity of the sanction 
or to inflict it to private entities.  
One unsuccessful attempt to develop an integrationist justification of state-
sanctions is that of Anthony Duff. In his view: 
The criminal law declares certain kinds of conduct to be 
wrong—to be criminal. But if the law, or the society in whose 
name it speaks, is to mean what it thus says, it is committed to 
censuring those who nonetheless engage in such conduct. To 
remain silent in the fact of their crimes would be to 
                                                 
30 Pragmatic concerns were often raised against shaming penalties. There are many who 
believe that shaming penalties are erratic and unreliable. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, 
Can Shaming Penalties Educate 65 University of Chicago L. Rev. 748-749 (1998). 
Others have pointed out that the more criminals are detected, the lesser the effectiveness 
of shaming penalties is. See Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: 
Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization (forthcoming in 36 
Journal of Legal Studies). 
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undermine—by implication to go back on—its declaration that 
such conduct is wrong.31 
 
Duff believes that the prohibitions enacted by the state have implications 
beyond their mere ceremonial verbal declaration, namely, that the state is 
wiling to censure behavior which conflicts with the prohibition. To remain 
silent, i.e., to fail to inflict sanctions casts doubts on the sincerity and 
seriousness of the moral commitment of the state and consequently 
undermines its authority. Put differently the willingness to inflict sanctions 
buttresses the state’s moral commitment to the norms it declares to be 
obligatory. The power to issue prohibitions and the power to inflict 
sanctions for their violation are thus closely interrelated. Assigning the 
power to issue prohibitions without also assigning the power to inflict 
sanctions undercut the state’s moral authority by casting doubts on its 
sincerity and moral commitment.  
Unfortunately this justification does not succeed. Failing to inflict 
sanctions does not necessarily (or even typically) cast doubts on the 
sincerity or the moral commitment of the state. To see why, think of the 
traditional utilitarian reasoning concerning punishment. Utilitarians argue 
that punishment is justified only when inflicting it maximizes utility. A 
failure on the part of a utilitarian to inflict sanctions for wrongdoing when 
the infliction of these sanctions does not contribute to the maximization of 
utility does not indicate insincerity on the part of the utilitarian. On the 
contrary, such a failure indicates a faithful adherence to utilitarianism. 
Furthermore, if the state can be sure that the sanctions will be inflicted 
privately, then a failure to inflict sanctions does not show a lack of moral 
commitment on the part of the state. This is certainly the case when the 
state sustains and reinforces the mechanisms for privately-inflicted 
sanctions as the advocates of shaming penalties urge it to do. As long as 
the state guarantees that sanctions will be inflicted either by its own 
officials or by delegating the power to reliable non-state agents, the state 
conveys serious commitment to the prohibitions it issues. 
                                                 
31 Duff, supra note 14 at 28.   
24 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 04 
 
Let me provide a different integrationist argument. This argument is meant 
to establish that criminal sanctions ought to be grounded in state’s 
judgments concerning the wrongfulness of an act and the appropriateness 
of the sanctions. Privately-inflicted sanctions, under this argument, are 
grounded in the private judgments of those who inflict them. They sever 
the link between the state’s judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the 
act or the appropriateness of the sanctions and the infliction of the sanction 
and, furthermore, I will show that, privately-inflicted sanctions are 
impermissible for that reason. It is impermissible on the part of the state to 
authorize private individuals to inflict suffering on the guilty.  
To establish the impermissibility of privately-inflicted sanctions assume a 
law-abiding citizen A, who is asked (or hired) by the state to inflict 
sanctions on convicted offenders. The state asks A to ostracize persons 
convicted of a particular offense. Upon being notified about the conviction 
of person B for this offense, A considers whether she ought to participate 
in the sentencing scheme by ostracizing B or limiting her social interaction 
with B.  
It seems that A’s decision to ostracize B could be based on three possible 
reasons. Ostracizing B could be based: i) on A’s judgment that ostracizing 
B is a way of fulfilling A’s civic obligations; it could be based ii) on A’s 
judgment that B committed an offence and deserves to be punished and it 
could be based iii) on A’s trust that the state made an accurate 
determination concerning the wrongfulness of B’s behavior and the 
appropriateness of the sanction. In the third case, A does not form an 
independent judgment with respect to these issues. In each one of these 
cases I will discuss two separate issues. First I will discuss the question of 
whether ostracizing B can count as punishment and second I will discuss 
whether it is permissible (either on the part of the private individual to 
inflict the sanction or on the part of the state to authorize such an 
infliction).  
Ostracizing B as a way of fulfilling one’s civic duties is of course harmful 
to B but it is not properly classified as a criminal punishment since it does 
not presuppose a judgment on the part of A that B has committed a wrong. 
Punishment, after all, involves the infliction of suffering grounded in a 
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particular reason, namely that a wrong has been perpetrated.32 Inflicting 
suffering as a means of fulfilling one’s civic duty does not presuppose a 
judgment by A concerning the prior commission of a wrong on the part of 
the criminal.  
Is it permissible for A to inflict suffering on B in order to fulfill his or her 
civic duty and to do it under circumstances in which A has not formed an 
opinion concerning the wrongfulness of B’s behavior? To establish the 
impermissibility of such an act think of the grievance which B can raise 
against A. Most convincingly, B can argue that it is unjust on the part of A 
to inflict a suffering without forming a judgment that B committed a 
wrong.  A’s assertion that he merely fulfills a civic duty implies that A is 
willing to inflict this suffering irrespective of whether B has committed a 
wrong. It seems evident that there can be no civic duty to inflict suffering 
under these conditions.  
Assume now that A ostracizes B because she formed the opinion that B 
has committed a wrong and deserves to be punished. This is indeed a 
punishment for wrongdoing but A’s judgment concerning the 
wrongfulness of B’s behavior and the appropriateness of the sanction is a 
private judgment on the part of A. The sanction does not reflect a 
judgment on the part of the state concerning the severity of the offence or 
the appropriateness of the sanction. The person inflicting the sanction may 
of course happen to form an opinion on these matters identical to that of 
the state. But this would be a happy coincidence and would not transform 
the private infliction of suffering into a state punishment. 
But is A’s infliction of suffering in this case impermissible? As long as 
A’s judgment is a private one made by A on the basis of her own 
judgment, it may be permissible. Yet, it is wrong on the part of the state to 
approve of the infliction of the sanction under these circumstances. To 
establish the impermissibility of the state’s support for A’s action, B could 
simply argue that the state may not simply endorse A’s judgment 
concerning the wrongfulness of B’s action. It would be wrong on the part 
of the state to grant A’s private judgment greater weight than B’s private 
                                                 
32 All conventional definitions of punishment include reference to such a requirement. 
See, e.g., Hart, supra note 4 pp. 4-5 (1968) 
26 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 04 
 
judgment concerning the wrongfulness of B’s behavior. Instead the state 
ought to make its own public judgment concerning the wrongfulness of 
B’s action and its ramifications. B has a legitimate grievance if she is 
subjected to A’s state-authorized private judgment and this grievance is 
distinct from any grievance she may have in being subjected to an (unjust) 
public judgment.   
Assume finally that A ostracizes B not because she believes it is her civic 
duty or because she forms an independent judgment concerning the 
wrongfulness of the act and the appropriateness of the sanction. Instead, A 
inflicts the sanction because she trusts the state’s judgment on these 
matters. It seems that sanctions inflicted on the basis of such trust are 
grounded in the state’s own judgments and can thus be regarded as 
criminal sanctions proper. The trustworthy citizen does not form an 
independent judgment concerning the wrongfulness of the action or the 
appropriateness of the sanction determined by the state. She simply 
functions as an instrument for realizing the state’s own judgments.  
But, it is doubtful whether such trust could be ever justified. If such trust 
could be justified, the citizen would be exempted from responsibility for 
the infliction of an inappropriate sanction.  The moral responsibility for 
inflicting such a sanction would rest with the state. Such an exemption 
from moral responsibility is sometimes justified with respect to state 
officials such as judges, prison guards or perhaps even executioners. 
Citizens however are different. They cannot abdicate their responsibility 
when suffering is inflicted.  
Consider an example of a person who opposes capital punishment. Such a 
person, no doubt, should resist the state’s invitation to execute an offender 
on the grounds that he believes that capital punishment is not an 
appropriate sanction. A private person who accepts the state’s invitation 
and inflicts such a sanction cannot escape moral responsibility by pointing 
out that the state asked him to do so.  
Inflicting a sanction under these circumstances exposes the perpetrator of 
the crime to a serious risk. Judgments concerning the appropriateness of 
sanctions for wrongdoing are highly contestable. A citizen who is asked 
by the state to inflict sufferings on a criminal should not rely on the state’s 
judgments when the consequences are so grave. The citizen is required in 
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this situation to form a judgment concerning the appropriateness of the 
sanction she is to inflict. If she fails to do so and, if, as a result of her 
unquestioning conformity with the state’s judgments, she inflicts an 
inappropriate sanction, she is accountable for her failure. Inflicting the 
sanction in these circumstances should therefore to be regarded as a 
private act on the part of the citizen founded on the citizen’s own 
judgment that the sufferings inflicted are appropriate. Failing to form an 
independent opinion concerning the appropriateness of the sanction does 
not transform the act from a private into a public act and does not turn it 
into a state sanction.  
The status of a citizen who is called upon by the state to inflict sanctions 
thus differs from the status of an official. A judge, a prison guard or even 
an executioner is often entitled or obligated to faithfully execute the state’s 
sentencing decisions. Such a duty to execute the state’s sentencing 
decisions is not boundless but it is much broader than the duties borne by a 
citizen. Demarcating the boundary between citizens and officials is not 
always easy, I admit, but it is this line which explains the difference in the 
moral responsibility of a judge or a prison guard on the one hand and of a 
citizen who is asked by the state to participate in the infliction of 
privately-inflicted sanctioning on the other. The former is an official who 
is typically entitled or even required to perform this task irrespective of his 
private convictions concerning the appropriateness of the sanction; the 
latter bears moral responsibility for what she does irrespective of whether 
she follows the state’s sentencing guidelines.  
To conclude, the integrationist argument maintains that the power to issue 
prohibitions and the powers to make determinations concerning the 
severity of the sanctions and to inflict them are inextricably interrelated. It 
is impermissible on the part of individuals to inflict sanctions without 
forming an independent judgment with respect to the wrongfulness of the 
action and the appropriateness of the sanctions. If they form such a 
judgment it is impermissible for the state to endorse that judgment. To the 
extent that criminal sanctions are justified, they therefore have to be 
inflicted by the same agent who creates the prohibitions. The suffering 
inflicted by privately-inflicted sanctions is grounded in a private judgment 
concerning the wrongfulness of the act or the appropriateness of the 
sanction. By privatizing the infliction of the sanction, the state effectively 
transfers not merely the “technical” power to execute the sanction. Instead, 
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it strips itself of the power to make binding determinations concerning the 
wrongfulness of the act and the appropriateness of the sanction. These 
determinations should instead be attributed to the individual who inflicts 
the sanction rather than to the state. By delegating this power to private 
individuals, the state in effect severs the link between the prohibitions it 
issues and the suffering inflicted on the offender. The individual who 
inflicts punishment on the basis of reasons he has acquired from the state 
acts on what she has come to believe and has judged to be a sufficient 
basis for action. The contribution to the genesis of his action made by the 
state’s invitation to participate in the infliction of sanctions is, so to speak, 
superseded by the agent’s own judgment.33 The suffering of the criminal is 
therefore a “private” suffering – a suffering founded on a citizen’s 
judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the act and the appropriateness 
of the sanction.   
The infliction of state-initiated privately-inflicted sanctions is 
impermissible. It is impermissible on the part of a citizen to inflict 
sanctions without forming an independent judgment concerning the 
wrongfulness of the alleged wrongful act. When such a private judgment 
has been formed, it is impermissible on the part of the state to approve of 
the infliction of the punishment since such an approval gives undue weight 
to the private moral convictions of the individual who inflicts the sanction. 
Furthermore, the belief that the sanctions for wrongdoing should reflect 
the state’s judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the act is quite 
fundamental to what we think of as a legal system. Instituting privately-
inflicted sanctions would thus challenge fundamental assumptions of the 
legal system. Under these assumptions criminal sanctions ought to be 
grounded in societal judgments generated by social and political 
deliberation.  
                                                 
33  This way of articulating my claim is borrowed from the discussion of Scanlon’s 
defense of freedom of speech. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression 
1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 204, 212 (1972).   
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IV. CODA: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY 
PUNITIVE PRACTICES 
Some of the most heated contemporary controversies in criminal law are 
grounded in conflicting intuitions concerning the role of the state. This 
section investigates two contemporary debates: the extensive use of 
shaming penalties and private prisons. These two issues involve two 
different forms of privatization. Shaming penalties privatize both the 
determination of the severity of the sanction and the infliction of the 
sanction. The agents who shame select the sanctions they wish to inflict 
(within the boundaries of the law) and they are also in charge of inflicting 
these sanctions. In contrast, the corporations operating private prisons 
inflict sanctions whose severity is determined by the state.  
A. Shaming Penalties  
Stigmatization imposes costs on offenders by identifying them and 
disseminating information about them. This in turn generates social and 
professional isolation and alienation from the rest of society. Potential 
wrongdoers are deterred because other individuals, law-abiding 
individuals in particular, might limit their social or professional interaction 
with them as a result of their conviction. Shaming penalties presuppose the 
active cooperation of private individuals. Such cooperation is needed 
because effective stigmatization requires that individuals distance 
themselves from the offenders and isolate them personally or 
professionally.  
This aspect of shaming penalties was diagnosed and condemned in James 
Whitman’s vigorous attack on shaming penalties:   
However much prisons may have declined into chaos, they are 
in principle controllable. However monstrous they may have 
become, we all agree that the state has the duty to manage 
them: to establish rules, to call review boards, to answer 
complaints in court. None of that apparatus exists to control the 
enforcement of shame. This means that though courts may 
wish to abandon the prison system and switch to a system of 
shaming, they must not be permitted to do so. Doing so means 
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abandoning their obligation to maintain a monopoly of the 
means of power—it means abandoning their duty to be 
imposers of measured punishment.34 
Whitman’s opposition to shame penalties is motivated by the sense that 
the state ought to maintain the exclusive power to punish irrespective of 
any instrumental considerations. In Whitman’s view a delegation of this 
power to the community deprives the criminal of his dignity irrespective 
of the severity of the sanctions that the community chooses to inflict on 
him. Whitman thus argues that the state’s control over the infliction of 
sanctions is grounded in the state’s duty to be “the imposers of measured 
punishment.”35  
Yet, Whitman fails to provide reasons for his assertion that only the state 
ought to control the infliction of sanctions. Advocates of shaming 
penalties do not have to accept Whitman’s dogmatic view that delegating 
the power to inflict sanctions means abandoning the state’s “obligation to 
maintain a monopoly of the means of power—it means abandoning their 
duty to be imposers of measured punishment.” Such an advocate could 
question whether by introducing shaming penalties the state indeed 
abandons its monopoly on power and whether it has an obligation to 
maintain such a monopoly in the first place.  
The integrationist justification may provide the missing rationale for 
Whitman’s powerful opposition to shaming penalties. Shaming penalties, 
as currently practiced in the US, constitute a highly deficient privately-
inflicted scheme of sanctions. Shaming penalties are often inflicted for the 
wrong reasons. Individuals who inflict shaming penalties are often 
instrumentally-motivated.36 In some cases the hostile reactions take place 
when the commission of the offence is indicative that the goods or 
services that are likely to be provided by an offender are inferior to those 
                                                 
34  See James Q. Whitman, What is wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions? 107 Yale 
L.J. 1055, 1091 (1998).  
35 Whitman, id 1091.  
36 See Harel & Klement supra note 30.  
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that are likely to be provided by non-offenders.37 In such cases the 
suffering inflicted on the criminal is merely a price reflecting the inferior 
quality of the goods or services rather than a genuinely punitive measure. 
But even when ostracizing the offender is based on a judgment that the 
offender has committed a wrong, this judgment is a private judgment on 
the part of those who ostracize, and it would thus be wrong for the state to 
grant its approval to this judgment; more specifically, it would be 
tantamount to granting undue weight to the judgment of the individual or 
private entity who inflicts the penalty.  
B. Private Prisons 
The emergence of private prisons has sparked a heated debate. For the 
most part this debate focuses on the relative efficiency of private prisons 
as compared to their publicly run counterpart.38 Yet some critics of private 
prisons challenge the legitimacy of these prisons. These critics share the 
view that the act of incarceration is “intrinsically governmental in nature” 
and that, as a consequence, a recourse to private prisons is inappropriate 
regardless of the relative efficiency of this penal form.39 An example can 
be found in Michael Walzer’s work:   
Police and prison guards are our representatives, whose 
activities we have authorized. The policeman’s uniform 
represents his representative character. When he puts his 
uniform he strips himself bare, so to speak, of his private 
opinions and motivations. Ideally, at least, he is equally 
energetic in enforcing laws that he does and does not like and 
                                                 
37 See Richard Posner, and Eric Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special 
Reference to Sanctions. International Review of Law and Economics 19(3): 369, 371 
(1999).  
38  See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons 55 Duke L.J. 437, 441 
(2005).  
39  For an examination of this claim, see Douglas C. McDonald, Public Imprisonment by 
Private Means: The Re-emergence of Private Prisons and Jails in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia 34 British J. Criminology 29, 39 (1994).  
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he treats all citizens, and all criminals, in the same way, 
whatever his personal prejudices.40    
Walzer further argues that the profit motive “exposes the prisoners to 
private or corporate purposes, and it sets them at some distance from the 
protection of the law.”41 Walzer thus worries that private prisons are 
operated by agents who are not motivated by the right sort of reasons. His 
concern is that it is unjust to expose prisoners to treatment governed by 
profit considerations.  
The main argument of this paper leads to the conclusion that even if the 
running of private prisons was not dominated by profit-motives, prisons 
cannot in principle be operated by private entities. These entities have a 
duty to make independent judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the 
act and the severity of the sanctions and those judgments are never 
judgments which can justify the infliction of state-approved privately-
inflicted sanctions.  
The examples of shaming penalties and private prisons demonstrate that 
the debates concerning the justification of state-inflicted sanctions are not 
merely theoretical. Even if a solely privately-inflicted scheme of sanctions 
is not a realistic option, there are currently reforms or reform proposals to 
grant private individuals the power to inflict sanctions for wrongdoing. 
These proposals have often been initiated and discussed by economists, 
sociologists and lawyers. This paper establishes that philosophical 




                                                 
40 See Michael Walzer, At McPrison and Burglar King, It’s…Hold the Justice, New 
Republic, Apr. 8, 1985 at 11. Somewhat inconsistently with his statement concerning the 
importance of public officials, Walzer suggests to use nongovernmental entities to 
perform some prison-like sanctions. See id at 12.  
41  See id at 12.  
